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the fIeld of the hIStory of	philosophy	is	rife	with	disagreements	about	its	own	
nature.	While	some	scholars	work	actively	 to	bring	historical	figures	and	ideas	
into conversation with contemporary debates, other scholars cry ‘Violence!’ and 
dismiss	their	work	as	anachronistic.	At	the	same	time,	detailed	textual	reconstruc-
tion	and	analysis	are	discounted	by	others	as	philology	rather	 than	philosophy,	
and	demand	is	made	for	‘Arguments!’	These	disagreements	have,	in	turn,	shaped	
the	ways	in	which	historians	of	philosophy	have	interacted	(or	not	interacted)	with	
contemporary	philosophers.	Too	often,	 the	 contribution	of	historically	oriented	
philosophers	to	modern	discussions	has	been	reduced	to	volunteering	ideological	
nuggets	mined	from	ancient	sources,	or	to	explicating	theories	whose	value	stems	
in	part	from	their	very	lack	of	connection	to	current	interests.1
This chapter highlights a different corrective and complementary role that 
historically	informed	philosophy	can	play	in	contemporary	discussions.	Analysis	
of	 the	 development	 of	 key	 definitions,	 concepts,	 principles,	 and	 so	 on,	 often	
illuminates	problematic	prejudices	 that	 call	 for	 a	 re-examination	of	 the	philo-
sophical	 considerations	 in	 their	 favour—a	 re-examination	 that	 should	 involve	
looking at the relevant historical context in which the idea developed. In what 
follows,	I	demonstrate,	via	the	case	study	of	medieval	and	modern	conceptions	
of	mystical	 experience,	 that	 turning	 to	 the	 relevant	historical	 context	can	also	
provide	viable	philosophical	resources	with	which	to	complement	existing	dis-
cussions.	What	 it	 takes	 for	 an	 experience	 to	 count	 as	 genuinely	mystical	 has	
been	 the	 source	 of	 significant	 controversy;	most	 current	 philosophical	 defini-
tions	of	‘mystical	experience’	exclude	embodied,	non-unitive	states,	but,	 in	so	
doing,	 they	exclude	 the	majority	of	 reported	mystical	 experiences.	 I	use	a	 re-
examination	of	the	full	range	of	reported	medieval	mystical	experiences—both	
1	 See	Chapter	9,	this	volume,	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	these	two	extremes,	as	well	as	an	alternative	
different	from	the	one	I	lay	out	here.
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in	the	apophatic	tradition,	which	excludes	or	denigrates	embodied	states,	and	in	
the	affective	tradition,	which	treats	such	states	as	fully	mystical—to	demonstrate	
how	a	better	understanding	of	the	historical	medieval	mystic	tradition	can	serve	
as	a	valuable	complement	to	ongoing	philosophical	discussions	of	religious	and	
mystical	experience.	I	conclude	by	suggesting	that	this	approach	can	also	help	
philosophers	engage	in	meaningful	interaction	with	scholars	working	on	similar	
topics in other disciplines.
10.1.	Implicit	Assumptions	and	the	Case	of 
‘Mystical Experience’
The	stories	behind	the	development	and	adoption	of	any	number	of	philosophical	
definitions,	principles,	 and	concepts	 are	 complex—and,	often,	problematic—in	
ways	that	should	impact	our	use	of	them	today.	I	focus	on	the	concept	of	‘mysti-
cal	 experience’	 in	 this	 chapter	 because	 it	 provides	 an	 excellent	 case	 study	 not	
only	of	this	point	but	also	of	the	ways	in	which	historically	informed	philosophy	
can respond. There is a rich tradition within medieval mysticism, for instance, 
of	treating	embodied	experiences	as	genuinely	mystical,	on	which	contemporary	
scholars	can—and	should—draw	in	order	 to	complement	 the	existing	focus	on	
non-sensory,	selfless	mystic	union.
In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 explicate	 the	 current	 philosophical	 con-
ception	 of	 mystical	 experience	 in	 the	 context	 of	 its	 20th-century	 influences,	
showing	how	prejudices	against	women,	emotions,	and	the	body	have	played	a	
significant	 role	 in	determining	which	sort	of	 reported	mystical	experiences	 fall	
under	 the	 	contemporary	 definition	 and	 which	 do	 not.	 The	 role	 of	 these	 non-
philosophical	factors	thus	motivates	enquiry,	in	Sections	10.2	and	10.3,	into	the	
philosophical	considerations	for	and	against	that	narrow	focus.
Let	 us	 begin	 our	 enquiry,	 then,	where	 everyone	 begins	 their	 philosophical	
enquiries	these	days:	with	the	corresponding	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
article.2	The	definition	of	‘mystical	experience’	in	the	entry	on	‘Mysticism’	does	
an	 excellent	 job	 capturing	 general	 philosophical	 assumptions	 about	mysticism	
and	is,	 in	fact,	specifically	described	as	‘suiting	more	specialized	treatments	of	
mysticism in philosophy’:
Mystical experience:	A	(purportedly)	super	sense-perceptual	or	sub	sense-perceptual	
unitive	experience	granting	acquaintance	of	realities	or	states	of	affairs	that	are	of	
a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or 
standard introspection.3
2	 In	this	case,	a	very	good	place	to	start.	It	possesses,	among	other	virtues,	an	excellent	bibliography	
of	previous	philosophical	treatments	of	mysticism.
3	 Jerome	Gellman	offers	this	definition	in	his	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on mysti-
cism.	The	more	general	definition	he	offers	does	not	include	the	word	‘unitive’	but	is	otherwise	the	
same.	See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017).
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For	our	purposes,	the	first	thing	of	note	about	this	definition	is	its	insistence	that	
a	mystical	 experience	must	 be	 either	 ‘super’	 or	 ‘sub’	 perceptual.4	To	 count	 as	
‘super sense-perceptual’,	an	experience	must	have	‘perception-like	content	of	a	
kind not appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory modalities … or standard 
introspection’.5	That	is,	although	a	mystical	experience	may	accompany	or	even	
be occasioned by sense perception, as when one has a mystical experience while 
watching	the	sun	set,	the	experience	itself	must	transcend	the	senses	in	a	distinc-
tive	way.	This	definition	explicitly	rules	out	visions,	auditions,	and	other	sense-
based	 experiences	 from	 the	 category	 of	 mystical	 experience:	 ‘[p]ara-sensual	
experiences	 such	as	 religious	visions	and	auditions	 fail	 to	make	an	experience	
mystical’6.	To	 count	 as	 ‘sub sense-perceptual’,	 in	 turn,	 an	 experience	must	 go	
beyond the senses in the other direction, so that the experience contains little to 
no	 phenomenological	 content.	 (As	 I	 discuss	 in	Section	 10.2,	 such	 experiences	
are	usually	seen	as	the	end	achievement	of	a	lengthy	process	of	self-loss	or	self-
annihilation	en	route	to	union	with	the	divine.)
The	second	significant	feature	in	this	definition	is	its	emphasis	on	the	inher-
ently	unitive	nature	of	a	mystical	experience.	Beginning	at	the	outset	of	the	20th	
century	with	William	James’	discussion	of	the	‘four	marks’	of	a	mystical	experi-
ence in Varieties of Religious Experience,7	and	continuing	with	Evelyn	Underhill’s	
influential	‘five	stages	of	the	mystic	path’	in	her	Mysticism: A Study of the Nature 
and Development of Man’s Spiritual Consciousness,8 modern scholars of mysti-
cism	have	generally	upheld	a	conception	of	selfless	mystic	union	as	the	ultimate	
end	of	 religious	 experience.9	Thus,	Underhill	 talks	 about	 a	 ‘death	of	 selfhood’	
in	her	depiction	of	the	unitive	life,	which	she	describes	as	the	highest	and	final	
stage of the mystic life,10	while	Jerome	Gellman	characterises	a	unitive	mystical	
4	 For	those	curious	as	to	what	Gellman	means	by	‘experience’	in	this	context,	the	following	comment	
seems	of	note:	‘Mystical	writings	do	not	support	William	James’	claim	(James	1958),	that	mystical	
experience	must	 be	 a	 transient	 event,	 lasting	 only	 a	 short	 time	 and	 then	 disappearing.	Rather,	 the	
experience	might	be	an	abiding	consciousness,	accompanying	a	person	throughout	the	day,	or	parts	of	
it. )RUWKDWUHDVRQLWPLJKWEHEHWWHUWRVSHDNRIP\VWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVZKLFKFDQEHHLWKHUÀHHWLQJ
or abiding. Hereafter, the reader should understand “experience” in this sense’	(emphasis	added).
5	 Text	elided:	‘including	the	means	for	sensing	pain	and	body	temperature,	and	internally	sensing	
body,	limb,	organ,	and	visceral	positions	and	states’.	See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	
(accessed	11	October	2017).
6	 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017).
7	 James	(1902).
8	 Underhill,	for	instance,	describes	the	final	stage	of	the	mystic	path	(which	she	bases	on	John	of	the	
Cross’	writings)	as	the	‘unitive	life’.	See	Underhill	(1911) as	well	as	Underhill	(1920).	The	previous	
four	 stages	are,	 respectively,	 ‘awakening	of	 self’,	 ‘purgation	of	 self’,	 ‘illumination’,	and	 ‘the	dark	
night	of	the	soul’.
9	 Whether	this	loss	of	self	should	be	understood	metaphorically,	ontologically,	or	phenomenologi-
cally	is	subject	to	debate.	For	our	purposes,	what	is	significant	is	merely	that	such	union	is	understood	
to	erase	any	distinction	between	the	consciousness	of	the	individual	having	the	mystic	experience	and	
the divine. 
10	 In	her	words:	‘In	that	most	dear	relation	all	feeling,	will,	and	thought	attain	their	end.	Here	all	the	
teasing	complications	of	our	separated	selfhood	are	transcended.	Hence	the	eager	striving,	the	sharp	
vision,	are	not	wanted	any	more.	In	that	mysterious	death	of	selfhood	on	the	summits	which	is	the	
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experience	as	involving	‘phenomenological	de-emphasis,	blurring,	or	eradication	
of	multiplicity’.11	Achieving	this	form	of	mystical	union	is	generally	taken	to	be	
both	necessary	for	an	experience	being	properly	mystical	and	a	(retroactive)	sign	
that	such	an	experience	has	been	achieved.
On	this	widely	accepted	understanding,	then,	affective	and/or	sensory	states	in	
which	the	subject	and	the	divine	remain	distinct	(such	as	visions	or	auditions)	do	
not	qualify	as	properly	mystical.	The	term	‘mystical’	is	reserved	for	these	super- or 
sub-sensory	unitive	states	that	grant	access	to	‘realities	or	states	of	affairs	that	are	
of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, 
or standard introspection’.12	Because	my	focus	in	this	chapter	is	on	the	accepted	
mode	of	mystic	experiences	rather	than	their	epistemic	import,	I	will	not	discuss	
the	‘realities’	mystical	experiences	purport	to	impart.	It	is,	however,	worth	noting	
that	they	are	meant	to	be	such	that	access	to	them	requires	utterly	transcending	
our	bodies	and	our	senses.
In	ruling	out	embodied	states	such	as	visions,	auditions,	and	physical	closure	
(surviving	for	long	periods	of	time	without	taking	nourishment	or	excreting),	the	
modern	definition	of	mystical	experience	carves	a	narrow	swath	in	the	full	range	
of	reported	mystic	experiences.	One	might	think	this	tight	focus	is	appropriate:	
after	all,	 the	question	of	how	to	ascertain	whether	someone’s	claim	to	mystical	
experiences	 is	valid	has	been	a	 topic	of	fierce	debate	since	at	 least	 the	Middle	
Ages.	 In	 the	 14th	 and	 15th	 centuries	 in	 the	 Latin	West,	 for	 instance,	 church	
authorities	were	understandably	alarmed	by	what	looked	like	the	claim	that—via	
the	 insight	 gained	 through	mystic	 union—people	 could	 transcend	 need	 of	 the	
church	 altogether.	Their	 alarm	was	 not	 entirely	 unjustified.	 In	 her	Mirror and 
Annihilation of Simple Souls,	for	instance,	Marguerite	Porete	(burnt	at	the	stake	
as	 a	heretic	 in	1310)	 argues	 that	 the	 soul	 can	be	 joined	 to	God	 in	 such	a	way	
that its will becomes God’s will, and that a person in this state need not pray or 
attend	Mass	or	participate	in	any	of	the	regular	activities	of	the	Christian	life.13 
Especially	in	light	of	the	enormous	surge	of	reported	mystic	experiences	in	the	
late	13th	and	14th	centuries	throughout	Europe,	church	leaders	became	wary	of	
people	and	communities	who	claimed	to	have	direct	contact	with	God;	after	the	
Reformation,	such	communities	were	often	actively	suppressed.14
In	the	20th	century,	debates	over	the	nature	of	mystical	experience	heated	up	
again.15	In	the	first	half,	 influential	scholars	such	as	William	James	and	Evelyn	
medium	of	Eternal	Life,	heights	meet	the	deeps:	supreme	achievement	and	complete	humility	are	one’	
(Underhill	1911:	444).
11	 See	Gellmann	(2014).
12 Ibid. 
13	 Porete	is	linked	with	the	antinomianists	or	Free	Spirit	heresy	for	this	reason,	although	the	actual	
connection	is	quite	unclear.	See,	e.g.,	Lerner	(1972).
14	 Communities	of	nuns	who	were	frequently	having	mystic	experiences	during	the	Eucharist	were	
sometimes	forbidden	the	host	until	such	experiences	ceased.	See	Walker	Bynum	(1991).
15	 For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	history	of	the	term	‘mysticism’	that	also	includes	helpful	references	
to	further	discussions,	see	Hollywood	(2012).	For	an	overview	of	the	complex	politics	involved	in	the	
struggle	to	define	mysticism	in	the	20th	century,	see	the	first	chapter	of	Beckwith	(1993).
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Underhill	 focused	 on	 the	 psychological	 and	 philosophical	 as	well	 as	 religious	
aspects	of	mysticism,	and	there	was	a	general	post-Freudian	and	Jungian	interest	
in	psychologising	 such	 experiences	 in	order	 to	uncover	 their	 true	 significance.	
This combined with the rise of medicine as a science and increased interest in 
identifying	physical	causes	for	altered	mental	states	to	produce	working	defini-
tions of ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical experiences’ from which physical and affective 
states	 were	 carefully	 ruled	 out—in	 part	 due	 to	 epistemological	 worries	 about	
how	to	distinguish	genuine	religious	experiences	from	hallucinations	or	medical	
conditions	such	as	epilepsy.	 In	 the	post-Auschwitz	world	of	 the	second	half	of	
the	 20th	 century,	 the	 search	 for	 a	 universal	 divine	 that	 undergirds	 outwardly	
conflicting	world	religions	gained	ground,	popularised	by	works	such	as	Joseph	
Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces	(originally	published	in	1949).	This	
push	towards	religious	pluralism,	epitomised	by	John	Hick’s	work	in	influential	
volumes	such	as	The Myth of God Incarnate	(1977)	and	God Has Many Names 
(1980),	 stressed	 the	 similarities	 in	descriptions	of	 selfless	mystic	union	among	
different	religious	traditions	in	order	to	argue	for	a	common	basis	for	them	all.
One	common	denominator	 in	 these	modern	discussions	has	been	 their	dis-
missal of embodied experiences as inferior states, and sometimes even as mislead-
ing	or	counterfeit	versions	of	true	mystical	experiences.	As	a	number	of	scholars	
have	noted	recently,	however,	in	ruling	out	these	sorts	of	experiences,	treatments	
of	mysticism	have	discounted	precisely	 those	mystical	 states	most	 common	 to	
women,	for	the	majority	of	people	reporting	such	embodied	mystical	experiences	
have been female.16
This dismissal of female experience has a long history. According to the widely 
accepted	Aristotelian	biology	of	the	Middle	Ages,	women’s	mental	acuity	is	com-
promised by their bodies, which are more sensitive to sensory perception and 
thus	more	susceptible	to	bodily	passions	and	emotions.17	Although	this	sensitivity	
makes	women	seem	better	candidates	 for	certain	sorts	of	 religious	experiences	
(such	as	visions	and	physical	states	such	as	stigmata	and	closure),	the	idea	that	
their	bodies	consistently	overpowered	their	intellective	capacities	simultaneously	
calls	into	question	their	reports	and	judgements	about	such	experiences.18	Thus,	
after	the	surge	in	reported	mystic	experiences	in	the	13th	and	14th	centuries,	the	
people	whose	reports	church	authorities	were	most	likely	to	scrutinise	closely	and	
then	condemn	were	predominantly	female—a	result,	no	doubt,	buoyed	by	further	
persistent	cultural	and	religious	beliefs	that	women	are	less	trustworthy	than	men	
and prone to exaggerate their emotional and physical states.19
16	 See	Jantzen	(1995)	and	Furlong	(2013)	for	book-length	treatments	of	this	topic.	Mooney	(1999)	
provides	an	explicit	discussion	of	how	gender	came	into	play	in	the	way	specific	mystics’	reported	
experiences	were	recorded,	altered,	and/or	understood.
17	 In	Caciola	(2003),	Nancy	Caciola	addresses	why	women	were	seen	as	more	likely	to	be	possessed	
by	demons	as	well	as	to	experience	divine	visions,	auditions,	etc.
18	 This	was	one	of	the	reasons	the	testimony	of	women	was	not	accepted	in	court.
19	 For	detailed	discussion	of	the	sorts	of	experiences	being	reported,	the	general	increase	in	embodied	
mystical experiences in this time period, and their perceived relation to women and women’s bodies, 
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The	close	negative	association	of	bodies	and	emotions	in	women	continues	
through	to	the	present	day.20	This	association	also	played	an	unacknowledged	role	
in	the	exclusion	of	embodied	states	from	the	contemporary	philosophical	defini-
tion of mystical experience.
In some cases, the negative associations between bodies and women is left 
implicit,	as	when	Evelyn	Underhill	dismisses	reports	of	ecstatic	union	and	other	
sensory	and	physical	mystic	states	as	a	result	of	‘the	infantile	craving	for	a	shel-
tering	and	protecting	love’	that	is	‘frequently	pathological’.	We	should	be	seeking	
to	transcend	our	bodies	and	ourselves,	she	claims,	not	to	wallow	in	pleasures	and	
pains	 that	 speak	 to	 our	 personal	 desires;	 such	visions	 and	 ecstatic	 experiences	
frequently	accompany	‘other	abnormal	conditions	in	emotional	visionaries	whose	
revelations	have	no	ultimate	characteristics’.21	Although	Underhill’s	disdain	for	
the role of emotions and physical aberrations in the mystic life is clear, what is 
left	unsaid	is	that	the	vast	majority	of	such	‘emotional	visionaries’	were	women,	
and	 that	 the	 sort	 of	mystics	whose	 experiences	 typify	 the	 superior	 unitive	 life	
are	almost	exclusively	male.22	(It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	‘ultimate	charac-
teristics’	which	 these	 revelations	 lack	 are	 those	 identified	 by	Underhill	 herself	
as	 essential	 to	 true	 mystic	 union,	 and	 that	 they	 include	 self-abnegation	 and	
physical	transcendence.)
In other cases, however, the negative associations between emotion, bodies, 
and	women	is	made	explicit.	David	Knowles,	 for	example,	describes	 the	‘pure	
spirituality’	of	 the	early	Middle	Ages	as	‘contaminated	by	another	current,	 that	
of a more emotional and idiosyncratic form of devotion … deriving partly from 
the	 influence	 of	 some	 of	 the	 women	 saints	 of	 the	 fourteenth	 century,	 women	
such	as	Angela	of	Foligno,	Dorothea	of	Prussia,	 and	Bridget	of	Sweden’.23 As 
with	Underhill,	 Knowles	 associates	 purity	 of	 spirituality	with	 an	 emphasis	 on	
transcendence	 of	 the	 particularities	 of	 the	 body	 and	 its	 affective	 states;	 unlike	
his	 predecessor,	 Knowles	 makes	 the	 connection	 between	 undue	 emotionality	
and	 women	 clear.	Although	 some	 male	 mystics	 also	 report	 embodied	 experi-
ences,	women	are	particularly	likely	to	be	linked	with	the	sort	of	emotional	and	
see	the	chapter	‘The	Female	Body	and	Religious	Practice’	in	Walker	Bynum	(1991),	and	Grundmann’s	
classic	(1936).
20	 See	the	introduction	to	Bordo	(1993)	for	a	succinct	history	of	this	association	and	its	manifestations	
in	modern	culture.
21	 Underhill	(1920:	20,	23).
22	 The	exception	to	this	general	rule	is	Teresa	of	Avila.	Simone	de	Beauvoir	(1989)	speaks	approvingly	
of Teresa in her largely critical chapter in The Second Sex on ‘The Mystic’, for instance, and Gellman’s 
lengthy	(2014)	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	article	from	which	the	definition	at	the	beginning	
of	the	chapter	(see	also	fn.	3)	is	taken	mentions	exactly	one	female	mystic:	Teresa	of	Avila.	Teresa	
is	of	obvious	philosophical	and	theological	significance—see	Christia	Mercer	(2017)	on	the	relation	
between her Interior Castle and Descartes’ Mediations—but	she	comes	a	full	century	later	than	the	
explosion	of	affective	mysticism	that	paper	focuses	on,	and	she	is	not	embedded	in	either	the	same	
sort	of	cultural	movement	or	religious	communities.	Perhaps	this	is	why	she	is	consistently	upheld	as	
the acceptable sort of female mystic.
23	 Knowles	(1948–9:	222–3).
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other	forms	of	religious	expression	which	are	portrayed	as	‘tainting’	the	appro-
priately	 	dispassionate,	 universal	modes	of	 true	mysticism	and	 connection	with	
the divine.
The same negative connection between women, bodies, and emotional reli-
gious	experiences	 is	drawn	by	Simone	de	Beauvoir	 in	The Second Sex. In this 
groundbreaking	work	of	feminist	philosophy,	de	Beauvoir	is	sharply	critical	of	the	
majority	of	female	medieval	mystics,	arguing	in	her	chapter	on	‘The	Mystic’	that	
women	are	more	likely	than	men	to	report	physical	mystic	experiences	because	of	
their	disadvantaged	status	as	Other,	which	has	led	them	to	become	more	suscepti-
ble	to	religious	fervour	and	extreme	emotional	states.	‘Not	clearly	distinguishing	
reality from make-believe, action from magic, the objective from the imaginary,’ 
she	writes,	‘Woman	is	peculiarly	prone	to	materialize	the	absent	in	her	own	body.’24 
In	other	words,	women	are	more	likely	to	passively	embody	their	religious	beliefs	
in	physical	and	emotional	suffering	or	ecstasy	than	they	are	to	attempt	concrete	
action	in	the	world	of	men	from	which	they	have	been	excluded.25
Prejudices	against	emotions,	bodies,	and	women	thus	factored	into	the	devel-
opment	of	the	contemporary	understanding	of	mystical	experiences	as	necessarily	
involving	non-sensory,	selfless	union.	Even	Jerome	Gellman,	author	of	the	working	
definition	quoted	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	admits	that	‘[t]he	thinking	that	
there	 is	 a	 common,	 unconstructed,	 essence	 to	mystical	 experience	 has	worked	
against the recognition of women’s experiences as properly mystical’.26
Here	we	can	see	in	action	the	first	sort	of	corrective	role	that	historically	ori-
ented philosophy offers: an examination of the development of conceptions of 
mysticism	in	the	20th	century	demonstrates	how	it	is	undergirded	by	problematic	
assumptions,	 and	 thus	 provokes	 a	 re-examination	 of	 its	 philosophical	 merits.	
In	Section	10.2,	I	demonstrate	another	aspect	of	 this	corrective	role,	 turning	to	
medieval	discussions	about	the	nature	and	range	of	mystic	experiences	in	order	to	
examine	the	philosophical	motivations	in	favour	of	excluding	physical	and	affec-
tive experiences from the properly mystical; as we will see, these motivations rest 
on	controversial	claims	about	the	nature	of	God	and	human	persons.	Furthermore,	
as I show in Section 10.3, the broader historical context was where standard views 
about	mystical	experiences	embraced	embodied	and	affective	expression.
10.2. Correction in Context: Apophatic Self-Abnegation
Prejudices	 against	 emotions,	 bodies,	 and	women	 have	 influenced	 the	 develop-
ment	of	current	philosophical	conceptions	of	what	counts	as	a	mystical	experi-
ence.	One	might	well	think	that	these	prejudices	(which	have	been	around	at	least	
as	 long	as	philosophy)	have	always	worked	against	 the	 inclusion	of	embodied,	
24	 De	Beauvoir	(1989:	672).
25	 See	also	her	discussion	of	religion	in	her	chapter	‘Situation’	in	de	Beauvoir	(1989:	621ff.).	
26	 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017).
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affective	experiences	in	the	mystical	canon—after	all,	attitudes	towards	the	body	
and towards women were not better	in	ages	past,	correct?	One	would,	however,	be	
wrong in so thinking. This is where historically informed philosophy has a second 
important	 corrective	 role	 to	 play:	 although	 there	 is	 a	 strain	 of	mysticism	 that	
excludes	embodied	experiences	from	the	properly	mystic	life—namely	apophati-
cism,	which	generally	focuses	on	the	ineffability	of	the	divine	and	the	inability	
of	 language	and	 thought	 to	express	any	direct	experience	of	 that	divine—such	
mysticism	represents	only	one	part	of	a	much	larger	tradition.	Its	cautions	against	
physical	and	affective	states	thus	need	to	be	understood	in	the	larger	context	in	
which	such	embodied	states	were	seen	as	the	mystic	norm,	and	the	reasons	those	
states	were	accepted	as	the	norm	need	to	be	taken	seriously.	This	approach,	like	
the	corrective	approach	described	and	 illustrated	 in	Section	10.1,	 is	also	easily	
generalisable	to	any	number	of	other	contemporary	philosophical	discussions:	it	
can	(and	should)	be	used	to	counter	mistaken	claims	of	‘But	this	is	the	way	things	
have always been!’ by presenting historical examples of real alternatives.
The apophatic tradition in Western Christian mysticism, for instance, has a 
long	 philosophical	 lineage—arguably	 beginning	 with	 Plato’s	 claims	 about	 the	
nature	of	the	Good	in	the	Republic	and	emerging	in	the	Middle	Ages	via	figures	
such	as	pseudo-Dionysius.	Developed	in	the	13th	century	and	onward	also	in	rela-
tion to the Islamic and Jewish mystic traditions, medieval apophaticism is typi-
fied	in	the	works	of	Marguerite	Porete,	Meister	Eckhart,	the	anonymous	English	
Cloud of Unknowing,	and	Nicholas	of	Cusa	(continuing	post-Reformation	most	
prominently	in	the	writings	of	Teresa	of	Avila	and	John	of	the	Cross).	During	the	
centuries	 in	which	mysticism	flourished	 as	 a	 form	of	 religious	 expression	 and	
in	which	it	(arguably)	found	its	fullest	form,	however,	apophaticism	was	a	non-
dominant	tradition	that	frequently	flirted	with	heresy.	This	fact,	of	course,	makes	
no	difference	for	its	philosophical	plausibility;	what	does	prove	significant	is	that	
in	 advocating	 a	 selfless	merging	with	 an	unknowable	God	 as	 the	ultimate	 end	
of	human	existence,	apophatic	mysticism	assumes	highly	contentious	premises	
about	both	God	and	human	nature.
Apophatic	mystics	tend	to	describe	the	spiritual	life	as	a	series	of	stages	that	
we	move	through	in	a	 journey	towards	unknowing	union	with	 the	unknowable	
divine.	 In	 this	 journey,	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 tasks	 is	 self-abnegation,	 or	
radical self-loss. In the Mirror of Simple Souls,	for	 instance,	Marguerite	Porete	
explains	how	we	can	gain	desired	union	with	God	through	complete	elimination	
of	the	conscious	self:
All	things	are	one	for	her	[the	Soul],	without	an	explanation	(propter quid),	and	she	
is	nothing	in	a	One	of	this	sort.	Thus	the	Soul	has	nothing	more	to	do	for	God	than	
God	does	for	her.	Why?	Because	He	is,	and	she	is	not.	She	retains	nothing	more	of	
herself	in	nothingness,	because	He	is	sufficient	of	Himself,	because	He	is	and	she	
is	not.	Thus	she	is	stripped	of	all	things	because	she	is	without	existence,	where	she	
was before she was created.27
27	 Porete	(1993:	218),	translation	slightly	modified.	As	Barbara	Newman	notes	in	her	discussion	of	
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This	stress	on	self-abnegation	runs	throughout	Porete’s	work:	such	annihilation	is	
essential	for	the	sort	of	complete	union	with	God	she	advocates.	Meister	Eckhart	
also	 frequently	 exhorts	 his	 listeners	 to	 detach	 themselves	 from	 all	 individual	
affections	 and	desires,	 so	 that	 they	 can	prepare	 themselves	 for	 the	final	 act	 of	
self-abnegation.	In	Counsel	23,	he	states	baldly:	‘There	is	still	one	work	[after	the	
soul	has	detached	itself	from	worldly	concerns]	that	remains	proper	and	his	own,	
and that is annihilation of self.’28	It	is	often	unclear	in	such	texts	precisely	how	to	
understand	this	sort	of	self-abnegation	(is	it	meant	to	be	understood	literally	or	
metaphorically,	ontologically	or	phenomenologically?),	but	the	stress	on	remov-
ing	any	sense	of	self	that	might	impede	complete	union	with	God	is	consistent	
throughout	the	apophatic	tradition.29
Given	this	emphasis	on	self-abnegation,	it	is	not	surprising	that	apophatic	texts	
frequently	 caution	 their	 readers	 against	 taking	unusual	 physical	 and	 emotional	
states	to	be	signs	of	mystic	union.	Such	states	might	indicate	a	sort	of	spiritual	
progress,	but	they	are	not	themselves	the	goal	of	the	contemplative	life.	Thus,	in	
his	late	14th-century	The Scale of Perfection, Walter Hilton warns against accept-
ing	physical	sensations	as	signs	of	true	mystic	union,	whether	‘in	sounding	of	the	
ear,	or	savoring	in	the	mouth,	or	smelling	at	the	nose,	or	else	[the	sensation	of]	
any	perceptible	heat	as	if	it	were	fire,	glowing	and	warming	the	breast’	(1.10).30 
This is a direct jab at Richard Rolle’s earlier Fire of Love, which describes Rolle’s 
mystical	 experiences	 as	 including	 physical	warmth	 in	 his	 body	 (especially	 his	
chest),	 a	 sense	of	 surpassing	 sweetness,	 and	 the	 sound	of	 celestial	music.	The	
anonymous	14th-century	Cloud of Unknowing	takes	aim	at	Rolle’s	‘fire	of	love’	
as	well,	cautioning	that	such	experiences	might	even	signal	something	sinister:	
‘For	I	tell	thee	truly	that	the	devil	has	his	contemplatives,	as	God	has	his’	(ch.	45).	
Meister	Eckhart,	in	turn,	‘tartly	condemn[s]	those	who	want	to	see	God	with	the	
same eyes with which they behold a cow’.31
Significantly,	in	all	these	cases,	the	God	in	whom	we	want	to	lose	ourselves	
is	 characterised	 as	 utterly	 unknowable	 and	 (at	 least	 for	 Eckhart	 and	 Porete)	
beyond	being	 itself.	Experience	of	 such	a	God	necessarily	 transcends	physical	
Porete’s	theory	of	self-abnegation:	‘In	this	dissolution	of	the	ego	no	room	remains	for	the	body:	even	
the	physical	humanity	of	Christ	is	no	longer	cherished	by	the	free	soul’	(Newman	2003:	203).	Porete	
explicitly	addresses	the	need	to	move	past	consideration	of	Christ’s	humanity	in	chapter	79.	See	also	
Hollywood	(1995).
28	 Counsel	23,	Meister Eckhart, 280. 
29 In extreme cases, apophatic mystics even saw self-abnegation as allowing for an identity of the 
mystic	with	God;	when	no	egoistic	self	remains,	one	can	be	filled	with	God	to	the	point	where	one	
becomes God. When the title character of the 14th-century	‘Sister	Catherine’	treatise	comes	out	of	a	
mystic trance and says to her confessor: ‘Sir, rejoice with me, I am become God!’, she is not boasting 
of	an	ascendance	to	divinity	but	rather	indicating	that	‘she’	no	longer	exists,	properly	speaking. See 
‘The	“Sister	Catherine”	Treatise’,	trans.	Elvira	Borgstädt,	in	McGinn	(1986:	358).	For	further	discus-
sion	of	this	treatise	and	also	this	general	tradition,	see	McGinn	(2005).	For	a	book-length	treatment	of	
this	topic	(that	focuses	particularly	on	Meister	Eckhart),	see	Morgan	(2013).
30	 Manuscript:	Cambridge	University	Library	MS	Add.	6686,	p.	284.	
31	 McGinn	(1981:	61).	The	sermon	referenced	is	Sermon	16b	in	Meister	Eckhart	(1936–	:	272).	
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and	 	affective	 experience:	 for	most	 apophatics,	 it	 entails	 the	 loss	 of	 conscious-
ness	 itself.	Human	beings	 thus	find	 their	 end	not	 just	 in	 separating	 their	 souls	
permanently	from	the	body	(a	claim	in	direct	contradiction	with	both	a	holistic	
conception	of	the	human	being	and	the	doctrine	of	the	resurrection	of	the	body),	
but	in	perfecting	the	act	of	self-annihilation.	The	highest	form	of	mystical	union	
for	the	apophatic	tradition	is	one	in	which	neither	human	beings	nor	God	exist	in	
standard ways.
In	part	because	of	this,	apophaticism	was	never	the	leading	mystical	tradition	
in	 the	medieval	 period.	 Instead,	 particularly	 during	 the	 13th	 to	 15th	 centuries,	
when the Western Christian contemplative movement was at its height, a more 
body-friendly	 and	 affective	 mysticism	 formed	 the	 dominant	 tradition,	 finding	
expression	 in	 a	 host	 of	 religious	 communities	 throughout	 Europe.	 In	 Section	
10.3,	 I	 turn	 to	 this	 tradition.	Contemporary	 discussions	 in	 analytic	 philosophy	
of	religion	ignore	the	reports	of	the	vast	number	of	people	who	claim	to	experi-
ence embodied states that connect them directly to the incarnate God. Whether 
this	oversight	results	from	ignorance	of	 the	relevant	 tradition	or	from	adopting	
the	problematically	exclusionary	conception	of	mystical	experience	discussed	in	
Section	10.1,	it	represents	precisely	the	sort	of	conceptual	lacuna	that	historical	
philosophy	is	primed	to	correct.	I	thus	offer	this	correction	as	the	conclusion	of	
my	case	study,	turning	in	the	final	section	(10.4)	to	a	discussion	of	other	benefits	
this historically based approach to philosophy yields—most notably, rich points 
of	connection	with	disciplinary	fields	beyond	our	own.
10.3. Correcting via Complement: 
Embodied Mystical Experiences
As	we	 saw	 in	Section	10.1,	 affective	mysticism	 is	 often	 dismissed	because	 of	
its association with the body and with emotions. This is, however, to miss the 
primary	significance	of	such	forms	of	connection	with	the	divine.	Human	beings	
are	physical	and	affective	as	well	as	intellective	and	volitional	beings:	our	primary	
interaction with reality—created and divine—is physical. Whereas the apophatic 
tradition	urges	us	to	transcend	those	modes	of	interaction,	the	affective	tradition	
encourages	us	to	delve	more	deeply	into	them.	Once	we	recognise	the	problematic	
prejudices	that	shaped	the	contemporary	conception	of	mystical	experience	and	
the	controversial	philosophical	assumptions	underlying	the	apophatic	exclusion	
of embodied experiences, we are in a position to see the rich history of embodied 
mystical experiences reported in the Middle Ages as offering a vital comple-
ment	to	the	narrow	range	of	religious	experiences	currently	studied	by	analytic	
philosophers. As with the corrective approaches mentioned in Sections 10.1 and 
10.2,	this	method	is	perfectly	generalisable	for	any	number	of	similar	situations:	
contemporary	discussions	of	love,	of	happiness,	of	persons,	and	so	on,	would	all	
be	enhanced	by	pulling	back	from	the	idiosyncratic	foci	of	modern	philosophy	
and incorporating insights from the past.
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In the case at hand, it is worth noting that the medieval emphasis on embod-
ied	 contemplative	experiences	developed	 in	part	 as	 a	 response	 to	12th-century	
gnostic	movements	 that	 either	denied	or	de-emphasised	Christ’s	 humanity	 and	
taught	 the	need	 for	purifying	our	 immaterial	 souls	 from	 the	 inherently	 corrupt	
material	realm.	In	other	words,	the	push	to	transcend	our	bodies	in	apophatic	mys-
tical	union	was	viewed	as	displaying	an	important	misunderstanding	of	both	God	
and	human	nature.	In	the	mainstream	contemplative	tradition,	figures	as	diverse	
in	education,	social	status,	and	geographical	 location	as	Hadewijch	of	Brabant,	
Catherine	of	Siena,	Richard	Rolle,	Marguerite	of	Oingt,	Beatrice	of	Nazareth,	Ida	
of	Louvain,	and	Angela	of	Foligno	viewed	altered	physical	states	(such	as	mystic	
death	or	bodily	‘closure’),	emotional	states	 (such	as	uncontrollable	weeping	or	
laughter),	and	parasensory	states	(such	as	visions	and	auditions)	not	as	distracting 
from	true	mystic	union	but	as	ways	of	experiencing a direct connection with the 
God	who	had	become	incarnate	for	us.
One	sign	of	this	tradition’s	understanding	of	the	properly	spiritual	subject	as	
a	holistic	union	of	body	and	soul	(as	opposed	to	a	soul	seeking	to	rise	above	the	
material)	is	its	reliance	on	the	imagination.	In	the	13th	century	and	onward,	the	
imagination	was	generally	taken	to	be	the	faculty	of	the	human	soul	that	stores	
phantasms	 (mental	 ‘pictures’	 formed	 via	 information	 collected	 by	 the	 external	
senses)	and	then	is	able	to	combine	those	phantasms	in	both	familiar	and	unfamil-
iar ways.32	In	a	popular	spiritual	exercise	of	the	time,	contemplatives	were	encour-
aged	to	imagine	themselves	present	at	key	moments	of	Christ’s	life,	particularly	
his	Passion,	the	explicit	purpose	of	which	was	to	generate	certain	sorts	of	affective	
responses	that	would	deepen	the	subject’s	devotion.33
This	 use	 of	 the	 imagination	 in	 spiritual	 exercises	was	 also	 closely	 linked	
with	 the	 idea	of	 ‘spiritual	vision’	 (visio spiritualis),	 a	 concept	borrowed	 from	
the	Augustinian	Platonic	tradition.	In	contrast	both	to	the	sort	of	material	vision	
(via	 the	 eye)	which	 is	 directed	 at	 physical	 objects	 and	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 intellec-
tive	 vision	 (via	 reason)	 which	 is	 directed	 at	 divine	 truths,	 spiritual	 vision	 is	
directed	 at	 images	 held	 in	 the	 imagination.	As	 such,	 it	mediates	 between	 our	
physical	sense	capacities	and	our	intellective	and	volitional	capacities;	physical	
experiences and intellective experiences come together and are combined in 
significant	 ways	 in	 spiritual	 vision	 (also	 associated	 in	 this	 tradition	 with	 the	
‘inner	senses’	and	the	‘inner	body’).	In	the	affective	mystical	tradition,	medita-
tive	 exercises	 such	 as	 imagining	 oneself	 present	 at	 the	 Crucifixion	 allow	 the	
inner	senses	to	undergo	spiritual	experiences	with	transformative	physical	and	
intellective/volitional	effects.	In	the	words	of	Niklaus	Largier,	such	meditation	
‘helps	 construct	 an	 inner	 space	 that	 creates	 affectively	 embodied	 access	 to	
the divine’.34
32	 For	a	clear	exposition	of	how	phantasms	function	in	human	cognition	for	Aquinas,	whose	view	on	
this	issue	was	extremely	influential	in	this	period,	see	MacDonald	(1993).
33	 For	further	discussion	of	this	meditation	and	its	use	of	the	imagination,	see	Matter	(2012).	
34	 Largier	(2003).
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Because	strong	emotion	was	closely	linked	both	to	bodies	and	to	our	ability	
to	imagine	things	vividly	(driving	us	to	deeper	devotion	and	closer	communion	
with	God),	it	was	welcomed	in	forms	of	religious	expression	that	celebrated	the	
Incarnation.	The	mystical	visions,	auditions,	smellings,	tastings,	and	so	on	associ-
ated	with	 such	affect	were	not	understood	as	 the	 result	of	overexcited	 sensory	
capacities	but	as	important	spiritual	experiences,	and	valued	as	such.	As	Patricia	
Dailey notes:
The	goal	of	affective	mysticism	is	not	to	excite	the	outer	body	into	a	Bacchic	frenzy,	
but	to	allow	one’s	affective	and	thus	embodied	experience	to	stimulate	the	construc-
tion of the inner body and then to allow the heart, innards, or inner senses to speak 
and	act	through	the	outer	body.35
Embodied	mystical	experiences	were	seen	as	connecting	the	human	subject	to	
God	in	ways	that	enhanced	rather	than	abnegated	our	distinctive	humanity:	‘All	
Christ’s members—eyes, breasts, lips and so on—were seen as testimony to his 
humanation,	and	the	devout	soul	responded	to	this	enfleshing	with	all	its	bodily	
capabilities.’36
Consider the following vision that Hadewijch of Brabant reports having 
during	the	celebration	of	the	Eucharist	(a	particularly	significant	act	in	the	affec-
tive tradition, since it involves a mystical physical connection between Christ and 
the	person	receiving	the	elements):37
With that he came in the form and clothing of a Man, as he was on the day when 
he	gave	us	his	Body	for	the	first	time	…	and	he	gave	himself	to	me	in	the	shape	of	
the	Sacrament,	in	its	outward	form,	as	the	custom	is;	and	then	he	gave	me	to	drink	
from	the	chalice,	in	form	and	taste,	as	the	custom	is.	After	that	he	came	himself	to	
me, took me entirely in his arms, and pressed me to him; and all my members felt 
his	in	full	felicity,	in	accordance	with	the	desire	of	my	heart	and	my	humanity.	So	
I	was	outwardly	satisfied	and	fully	 transported	…	[After	a	short	 time]	I	saw	him	
completely	come	to	naught	and	so	fade	and	all	at	once	dissolve	that	I	could	no	longer	
recognize	or	perceive	him	outside	me,	and	I	could	no	longer	distinguish	him	within	
me.	Then	it	was	to	me	as	if	we	were	one	without	difference.	(Vision	Seven)38
This	account	begins	with	a	very	physical	sort	of	mystic	union	with	Christ	 (via	
the	inner	senses):	note	that	it	is	described	as	fulfilling	the	desire	of	her	humanity. 
Even	when	she	reports	the	later	experience	of	being	‘as	if	we	were	one	without	
difference’ with God, the metaphor at play is one of digestion: Christ has become 
one	with	her	(and	she	with	him)	in	the	way	that	food	and	drink	become	one	with	
us—part	of	our	very	being.
35	 Dailey	(2012:	269).
36	 Walker	Bynum	(1991:	91).
37	 Caroline	Walker	Bynum	has	written	extensively	on	the	significance	the	Eucharist	takes	on	in	the	
affective tradition; see the chapters ‘The Body of Christ in the Later Middle Ages’ and ‘Women 
Mystics	and	Eucharistic	Devotion	in	the	Thirteenth	Century’	in	Walker	Bynum	(1991).
38	 Hadewijch	(1980:	281).
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Although	Hadewijch	also	frequently	describes	a	loss	of	self	in	mystic	union,	
she	 does	 so	 without	 downplaying	 the	 significance	 of	 affective	 and	 embodied	
experiences.	This	acknowledgment	of	 the	 importance	of	physicality	 for	human	
subjects	is	present	in	her	metaphorical	language	as	well.	In	one	particularly	strik-
ing	depiction	of	union	with	the	divine,	for	instance,	she	describes	how	complete	
union	can	also	include	eternal	self-preservation:
Where	the	abyss	of	his	wisdom	is,	God	will	teach	you	what	he	is,	and	with	what	
wondrous	sweetness	the	loved	one	and	the	Beloved	dwell	one	in	the	other,	and	how	
they	penetrate	each	other	in	a	way	that	neither	of	the	two	distinguishes	himself	from	
the	other.	But	they	abide	in	one	another	in	fruition,	mouth	in	mouth,	heart	in	heart,	
body	in	body,	and	soul	in	soul,	while	one	sweet	divine	nature	flows	through	both	and	
they	are	both	one	thing	through	each	other,	but	at	the	same	time	remain	two	different	
selves—yes,	and	remain	so	forever.	(Letter	9)39
A	less	developed	but	just	as	striking	portrayal	of	this	sort	of	physical	and	self-
preserving	 union	 is	Marguerite	 of	Oingt’s	 vision	 in	which	 she	 sees	 herself	 as	
a withered tree that is then watered by a stream that is Christ.40 Having drawn 
the	‘living	water’	into	herself,	Marguerite	then	sees	the	names	of	the	five	senses	
written	on	her	newly	revived	branches.	In	this	way,	she	experiences	both	union	
with	God,	as	the	water	fully	penetrates	the	tree	of	her	selfhood,	and	the	preserva-
tion	and	flourishing	of	that	self,	in	body	as	well	as	spirit.
There	is	much	more	to	be	said	on	this	topic,	of	course,	and	an	extensive	litera-
ture	reporting	affective	and/or	embodied	mystical	experiences	that	involve	unme-
diated	union	with	God.	Even	this	brief	discussion	should	be	sufficient,	however,	
to	demonstrate	that	inclusion	of	these	states	would	enrich	and	complement	current	
philosophical	discussions.	As	we	have	seen,	even	an	exclusive	focus	on	reports	of	
unitive	mystical	experiences	(as	the	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	defini-
tion	addressed	 in	Section	10.1	does)	need	not	 rule	out	embodied	and	affective	
mystical	states.	Ongoing	debates	in	analytic	philosophy	concerning	the	nature	and	
role	of	religious	and	mystical	experiences	would	benefit	from	considering	embod-
ied	mystical	 experiences	 together	with	 those	 of	 selfless	 union—particularly	 in	
light	of	the	spurious	motivation	undergirding	their	exclusion	in	the	first	place.
10.4. Philosophical Morals and Historical Stories
So	far	in	this	chapter,	I	have	focused	on	the	corrective	and	complementary	roles	
that	 a	 historically	 oriented	 approach	 can	 occupy	 in	 philosophical	 discussions.	
First,	I	have	argued	that	analysis	of	the	development	of	key	definitions,	concepts,	
principles,	 and	 so	 on,	 can	 often	 illuminate	 problematic	 prejudices	 that	 should	
motivate	 a	 re-examination	 of	 the	 philosophical	 considerations	 in	 their	 favour.	
Secondly,	I	have	claimed	that	this	re-examination	should	involve	looking	at	the	
39	 Hadewijch	(1980:	66).
40	 Duraffour	et al.	(1965:	139).
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relevant historical context in which the idea developed. Thirdly, I have demon-
strated	via	the	case	study	of	medieval	and	modern	conceptions	of	mystical	experi-
ence	that	turning	to	the	relevant	historical	context	can	sometimes	provide	viable	
philosophical	resources	with	which	to	complement	existing	discussions.	In	this	
fourth	and	final	section,	I	conclude	by	suggesting	that	this	approach	can	also	help	
philosophers	engage	in	meaningful	interaction	with	scholars	working	on	similar	
topics in other disciplines.
Consider again the example of the contemporary philosophical conception of 
mystical	experience,	which	picks	out	a	narrow	swath	of	the	sum	total	of	reported	
mystical experiences, and which correspondingly restricts philosophical inves-
tigations of mysticism in general. As I noted in Section 10.1, this conception is 
specifically	 characterised	 as	 ‘suiting	more	 specialized	 treatments	 of	mysticism	
in philosophy’41	for	its	focus	on	particular	sorts	of	unitive	experiences.	But	what	
about	the	addition	of	‘unitive’	in	the	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	defini-
tion	makes	it	suited	to	philosophical	examination?	Basically,	the	fact	that	it	picks	
out	 the	 particular	 range	 of	 experiences	 that	 philosophers	 became	 interested	 in	
over	the	course	of	the	20th	century.	As	we	saw,	though,	predispositions	against	
women,	bodies,	and	emotions	played	an	important	role	in	developing	that	focus.42 
Not	only	is	this	lamentable	on	purely	philosophical	grounds,	but	it	has	also	inter-
fered	with	philosophers	having	productive	conversations	outside	their	own	field.
There	is	a	vast	literature	on	mysticism	and	mystical	experiences	by	scholars	
in	religious,	medieval,	and	gender	studies,	for	instance,	as	well	as	in	history	and	
in	 the	various	 languages	 in	which	medieval	mystic	 texts	were	written.	Careful	
studies	of	 particular	 contemplative	figures,	 general	movements,	 and	 the	nature	
of	mysticism	itself	abound	in	these	fields.	And	yet	philosophers	have	distanced	
themselves	from	these	resources	and	stuck	to	increasingly	specialised	discussions	
of idiosyncratic experiences. The recent Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Mysticism	contains	essays	by	twenty-two	scholars	at	various	career	stages	who	
represent thirteen distinct disciplines—and there is not a philosopher among 
them. The reason for this is simple: the ‘philosophical’ conception of mystical 
experience	corresponds	so	poorly	to	what	everyone	else	is	talking	about	that	there	
is almost no point in trying to engage in a common conversation.
Philosophers	 excel	 at	 biting	bullets,	 and	 this	 complete	 lack	of	 engagement	
with	other	disciplines	might	be	one	 that	 some	would	happily	 swallow.	By	 this	
point	in	the	chapter,	however,	I	hope	that	it	is	clear	what	philosophy	would	lose	
out	on	as	a	result.	As	noted	in	Section	10.3,	there	exists	a	rich	history	of	embod-
ied and affective mystical experiences—and a correspondingly rich secondary 
41	 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017).
42	 There	 is	also	a	contemporary	focus	on	distinguishing	 true	from	false	mystic	experiences,	which	
belies	epistemological	concerns	that	mystics	themselves	largely	do	not	express.	The	idea	that	it	would	
somehow	be	easier	to	determine	whether	a	super-	or	sub-sensory	unitive	experience	is	veridical	than	
whether an embodied mystical experience is veridical, however, seems to me to betray precisely the 
sort	of	distrust	of	the	body,	emotions,	and	the	people	most	likely	to	report	having	these	experiences	
that	makes	the	contemporary	definition	problematic	in	the	first	place.
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	literature	 on	 these	 experiences	 in	 any	 number	 of	 other	 disciplines—that	 could	
be	used	 to	enhance	current	philosophical	discussions	of	mystical	 and	 religious	
experience.	Realising	this,	however,	requires	doing	historically	informed	work.
The	general	applicability	of	this	particular	case	study	should	be	obvious:	phi-
losophy often paints itself into an ideological corner when it looks only to itself 
for	insight.	In	any	number	of	cases,	it	has	arrived	at	a	starved	and	impoverished	
version	of	the	conversation	current	in	broader	cultural	circles:	about	love,	about	
happiness,	about	knowledge,	about	embodiment,	and	so	on.	Rather	than	congratu-
late	ourselves	for	having	figured	out	what	‘really	matters’	and	sticking	to	that,	we	
would	do	well	to	interact	with	discussions	happening	in	other	fields—something	
we	will	only	be	in	a	position	to	do	if	we	have	first	done	the	work	of	examining	
the	historical	underpinnings	of	our	operating	assumptions,	correcting	and	comple-
menting them as necessary.43
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